A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her …xed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the …rst step. In the second step, …rst she constructs for each maximal alternative identi…ed in the …rst step its lower contour set (i.e., the set of alternatives which are dominated by it in S), and then she eliminates from the maximal set all of those alternatives so that the following justi…cation holds: there exists another maximal alternative whose lower contour set strictly contains that of another maximal alternative. This procedural model captures the basic idea behind the experimental …nding known as "attraction e¤ect". We study the rationalizability of reason-based choice correspondences axiomatically.
Introduction
Rationality of choice behaviour cannot be assessed without seeing it in the context in which a choice is made (Sen, (1993) and (1997) ). This view is con…rmed by a sizeable amount of experimental …ndings which show that when added to a choice set a new relatively inferior alternative can increase the attractiveness of one of the alternatives obtainable from the original set (see, Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers, (2006) ).
This systematic observed choice behaviour, known as "asymmetric dominance e¤ect" or "attraction e¤ect", 1 is explained in terms of bounded rationality. In a di¢ cult and con ‡ict-…lled decision, where there is no escape from choosing, individuals choose by tallying defensible reasons for one alternative versus the other, rather than by trading o¤ costs and bene…ts.
Furthermore, in this respect, the dominant structure of alternatives in the choice set provides the decision-maker with good reasons for her choice (see, Simonson (1989) , Tversky and Simonson (1993) , and Sha…r, Simonson, and , and the references cited therein). 2 Let us give an example. Suppose that an individual wishes to buy herself a digital camera for next holiday in Rome, and she has a choice among three competing models, say, x, y, and x 0 , where each model is characterized by exactly two equally important dimensions, say, price and quality. She may …nd the choice between x (resp., x 0 ) and y hard because x (resp., x 0 ) is better than y on one dimension (say, price) while y is better than x (resp., x 0 ) on the other dimension (say, quality). She would …nd the choice between 1 Strictly speaking these two e¤ects are slightly di¤erent, and the di¤erence refers to the attributed levels of the new alternative that is added to the choice set. In this paper we will refer only to the attraction e¤ect since the asymmetric dominance e¤ect is a special case. 2 A …rst formalization of how reasons a¤ect the individual's decisions in a game theoretical framework appears in Spiegler (2002) .
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x and x 0 an easy one because the former dominates the latter with respect to both dimensions. Thus, while she has a clear and indisputable reason for choosing x over x 0 , she cannot hold any compelling reason for choosing only x (resp., x 0 ) from fx; yg (resp., fx 0 ; yg) or only y from fx; yg and fx 0 ; yg.
However, the fact that x 0 is obtainable from fx; y; x 0 g and x is better priced and of higher quality than x 0 , whilst y is only of higher quality, may provide her with a reason for choosing only x from fx; y; x 0 g.
This pattern of observed choices -which is not con…ned to consumer products, but also extends to choices among gambles, job applicants, political candidates (Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers, (2006)) -is partially consistent with the standard economic interpretation of rationality which is preference maximization.
In our example, the individual has an incomplete preference relation on fx; y; x 0 g because she deems x and y choosable from fx; yg, x 0 and y from fx 0 ; yg, and only x from fx; x 0 g and fx; y; x 0 g. For any feasible set she faces, she chooses undominated alternatives relative to her preferences in that set. However, contrary to what is envisaged from the standard preference maximization hypothesis, she discards y from her choice. This suggests that our individual may have re…ned her choice by using the information available from the entire choice set (given her preferences) as a tie-breaking rule: As x dominates x 0 , but y does not, the set of alternatives dominated by x strictly contains that dominated by y, providing the individual with a convincing reason for choosing only x from fx; y; x 0 g (see, e.g., Tversky and Simonson, (1993), p. 1185).
The idea of rationalizing choice correspondences in terms of a two-stage choice procedure whereby the individual arrives at a choice by using the information obtainable from the entire set in the second round of elimination appears in Ok (2004) , who identi…es in these terms all the choice corre-2 spondences satisfying the canonical Property (also known as Cherno¤ choice-consistency condition or basic contraction consistency). Property requires that an alternative that is deemed choosable from a feasible set T and belongs to a subset S of T must be deemed choosable from S (Sen, (1971) ).
Indeed many contexts of choice which lead individuals to violate the normatively appealing Property , and so the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) proposed by Samuelson (1938) , 3 and the ways in which they interact, await further investigation.
Returning to our consumer, suppose that another camera model y 0 -which is dominated by y with respect to both of the dimensions, whilst it is of higher quality than x and x 0 and worse priced than them -is added to the set fx; y; x 0 g. In this new choice-context, the individual loses the compelling reason which led her to choose x from fx; y; x 0 g because the set of alternatives dominated by x does not contain that dominated by y, and vice versa. The presence of y 0 (which indeed should be irrelevant for her choice) makes x and y reasonably choosable from the grand set, whereas its absence makes only x choosable from fx; y; x 0 g. The combination of these choices violates Property even though there is nothing particularly "unreasonable" in this pair of choices.
What is more, the described tie-breaking rule may lead an individual to su¤er from certain framing manipulations. Let us give another example. Suppose an employee spends her lunch vouchers in one of her local restaurants. Assuming that her preferences may be incomplete and that her vouchers are enough to get any kind of luncheon served at any chosen local restaurant, on day 1 she steps into one of the local restaurants …nding three
Day
Menu Choice 1 {luncheon 1, luncheon 1' , luncheon 2} {luncheon 1} 2 {luncheon 2, luncheon 2' , luncheon 3} {luncheon 2} 3 {luncheon 3, luncheon 3' , luncheon 1} {luncheon 3} Figure 1 : Table 1 .
kinds of luncheon on the menu (say, luncheon 1, luncheon 1', and luncheon 2 ). Our employee strictly prefers luncheon 1 to luncheon 1', whereas she cannot make up her mind between luncheon 1 (resp., luncheon 1') and luncheon 2. To satisfy one's hunger she goes for luncheon 1 as it dominates luncheon 1', but luncheon 2 does not. The day after (day 2) she steps into another available local restaurant to explore her range of choices, and it is serving three luncheons (say, luncheon 2, luncheon 2' and luncheon 3, where luncheon 2 is the same luncheon served from the restaurant of day 1). Because she dithers between luncheon 2 (resp., luncheon 2') and luncheon 3, whereas she strictly prefers luncheon 2 to luncheon 2', she goes for luncheon 2 as it seems the most "attractive" according to the menu of the day (i.e., luncheon 2 dominates luncheon 2', but luncheon 3 does not). On day 3, she decides to return to the restaurant of day 1 which is serving only luncheon 3, luncheon 3' and luncheon 1 (luncheon 1 is the same luncheon served on day 1, and luncheon 3 is the same luncheon served from the restaurant of day 2). Since she strictly prefers luncheon 3 to luncheon 3', while she cannot make up her mind between luncheon 3 (resp., luncheon 3') and luncheon 1, she goes for luncheon 3 because it dominates luncheon 3', but luncheon 1 does not. Her choices are displayed in Table 1 .
The choices made over the three days may appear wierd from an eco-nomic perspective, but they are not as irrational in any minimal signi…cant sense. The reason for this is that the employee's preferences are insu¢ cient to solve the decision problem that she faces, and so she constructs a reason on the basis of the problem that she faces by using her known preferences.
Since each day there is a maximal luncheon (i.e., luncheon 1 on day 1, luncheon 2 on day 2, and luncheon 3 on day 3) which outperforms the other maximal one (i.e., luncheon 2, luncheon 3, and luncheon 1, respectively), this allows her to complete her preferences by knocking the latter o¤.
Motivated by these observations, we believe that there is a need to shed more light on the phenomenon of how individuals use the set under consideration to identify the most "reasonable"alternatives following the revealed preference approach introduced by Samuelson (1938) , the importance of which has been recently emphasized by Salant (2006, 2007) . 4 With this aim we provide a full characterization of a choice correspondence as exempli…ed above in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible …nite set, the individual eliminates from the decision all of the dominated alternatives according to her …xed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the …rst step. In the second step, she eliminates from the maximal set, identi…ed in the …rst step, those alternatives which have the set of dominated alternatives strictly contained in that of another undominated alternative. Whenever a choice correspondence can be rationalized with the described two-stage rationalization, we say that the choice correspondence is a reason-based choice correspondence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by outlining our axiomatic framework, delineating the behavioural consistency properties used in our characterization result. Next, we provide our characterization of reason-based choice correspondences. We conclude with a brief discussion of our result in relation to the literature.
Preliminaries
Let X be a universal …nite set of conceivable alternatives that is …xed from now on. Let S be a collection of all nonempty subsets of X. By a choice correspondence C on S we mean a map C which assigns a nonempty subset
is choosable from S. Moreover, given x; y 2 X, with x 6 = y, x; y 2 C (S)
for some S 2 S does not necessarily mean that x is indi¤erent to y, but we interpret it as both of them are choosable from S.
Two distinct alternatives x and y in X are said to be indistinguishable on a set S 2 S, x; y = 2 S, if, for all z 2 S, one of the following holds:
1. fxg = C (fx; zg) ) fyg = C (fy; zg);
2. fzg = C (fx; zg) ) fzg = C (fy; zg);
3. fx; zg = C (fx; zg) ) fy; zg = C (fy; zg).
Then x and y are indistinguishable one another if they behave in the same way with respect to direct choice comparisons with other alternatives.
Observe that if x and y are not indistinguishable it does not necessarily mean that they are C incomparable as we are silent on C (fx; yg). 5 The set of positive integers is denoted by N = f1; 2; :::g. Let X X be a binary relation on X which represents the individual preference relation.
As usual we write x y for (x; y) 2 , and x y for (x; y) = 2 . A relation X X is acyclical if, for all t 2 N and for all x 1 ; :::; x t 2 X, x x +1 for all 2 f1; 2; :::; t 1g implies x t x 1 . For any S 2 S, (x; S) denotes 5 For a choice theoretical study of incomplete preferences, see Eliaz and Ok (2006) . 6 the lower section of restricted to S at x, i.e., (x; S) = fy 2 Sjx 2 Snfyg; y xg. S T means that every alternative in S is in T , whilst S T means that S T and S 6 = T .
For S 2 S and a binary relation on X, the set of -maximal alternatives in S is M (S; ) = fx 2 Sjy x for all y 2 Snfxgg. Whenever a choice correspondence C on S has an acyclical relation on X such that, for all S 2 S,
we say that C is a reason-based choice correspondence.
Now we de…ne some choice-consistency conditions of interest. The …rst is borrowed by Sen (1977) which is much weaker than Property .
The second property is a weakening of Sen's (1971) Property . Property demands that for all pair of feasible sets, say S and T , and for all pair of alternatives, say x and y, if x and y are choosable from S, a subset of T , then y is choosable from T if and only if x is choosable from T . Our Weak Property on the other hand requires Sen's Property to hold if x and y are indistinguishable one another on T nfx; yg.
Weak Property (W ). For all S; T 2 S : S T , x; y 2 C (S), and
The third property is a weakening of Samuelson's (1938) WARP, according to which if x 2 C(S) and y 2 SnC(S), then there is no feasible set T , with x 2 T , such that y 2 C(T ). Our Weak WARP on the other hand demands Samuelson's WARP to hold if x is uniquely chosen from S, and we add to the set S a feasible set T such that x and y are indistinguishable one another on T , with x; y = 2 T .
Weak WARP (WWARP). For all S; T 2 S : fxg = C (S) and y 2
The following property is a straightforward strengthening of the choice such that x is the only choice from T , and x is choosable over every other
Weak WARNI (WWARNI). For all S 2 S, x 2 S : for all y 2 C (S) there exists T S : fxg = C (T ) and fx; yg T , and x 2 C (fx; yg) for all
The …nal property that we will consider here for reason-based choice correspondences plays a key role in the development of this paper. It posits 8 that for three distinct alternatives obtainable from a universal set, say x, y, and z, if x is strictly better than y and not worse than z, and y is not worse than z, then x must be the only choice from fx; y; zg. This property is motivated by the empirical research which established the importance of the attraction e¤ect in decision making. Our property captures this phenomenon requiring a bias toward the most defensible alternative in term of reasons.
Reason-Based Bias (RBB). For all distinct x; y; z 2 X : fxg = C (fx; yg), x 2 C (fx; zg), and y 2 C (fy; zg) ) fxg = C (fx; y; zg).
Reason-Based Choice Correspondences
The following theorem shows that whenever X is a universal …nite set of alternatives, the axioms above characterize completely a reason-based choice correspondence. Proof. Suppose that C is a reason-based choice correspondence on S. That C satis…es 2 is straightforward, thus omitted. We show that C satis…es the remaining choice-consistency conditions listed above.
To prove that C satis…es W , take any S; T 2 S, such that S T , and assume that x; y 2 C (S) and x and y are indistinguishable on T nfx; yg.
Let y 2 C (T ). We show that x 2 C (T ). Because x; y 2 M (S; ), neither x y nor y x. Since y 2 M (T; ), then z y for no z 2 T nfx; yg. As x and y are indistinguishable on T nfx; yg, z x for all z 2 T nfx; yg. It follows that x 2 M (T; ). Moreover, there does not exist z 2 M (T; ) nfyg such that (y; T ) (z; T ), by our supposition. Because x and y are indistinguishable on T nfx; yg Snfx; yg, and neither x y nor y x,
we have that (y; T ) = (x; T ). It follows from our supposition that x 2 C (T ). Suppose that y = 2 C (T ). We show that x = 2 C (T ). Assume, to the contrary, that x 2 C (T ). By an argument similar to the case above, we have that y 2 C (T ), a contradiction.
To show that C satis…es WWARP, let x; y 2 X be two distinct alternatives, and take any S; T 2 S such that x; y 2 S and x; y = 2 T . Suppose that To show that C satis…es SBDC, take any S; T 2 S, and suppose that fxg = C (S) and fxg = C (fx; yg) for all y 2 T . Because fxg = C (S), it follows that either fxg = M (S; ) or (z; S) (x; S) for all z 2 M (S; ) nfxg. As x y for all y 2 T nfxg it follows that x 2 M (S [ T; ). To prove that C satis…es WWARNI, take any S 2 S, with x 2 S, and suppose that for every y 2 C (S) there exists T S such that fxg = C (T ) and fx; yg T , and x 2 C (fx; yg) for all y 2 S. We show that x 2 C (S). By the way of contradiction, let x = 2 C (S). Thus x = 2 M (S; )
Suppose that M (S [
or (x; S) (z; S) for some z 2 M (S; ) nfxg. As x 2 C (fx; yg) for all y 2 S, it follows that x 2 M (S; ). Thus, it must be the case that (x; S) (z; S) for some z 2 M (S; ) nfxg. If z 2 C (S), it follows from our supposition that for no T S it can be that fxg = C (T ) and fx; zg T , a contradiction. Otherwise, let z = 2 C (S). As S is …nite and C is a reason-based choice correspondence, there exists y 2 C (S) such that y 2 M (S; ) and (z; S) (y; S). By the transitivity of set inclusion, (x; S) (y; S). Therefore, by our supposition, we have that for no T S it can be that fxg = C (T ) and fx; yg T , a contradiction.
To prove that C meets RBB, let x; y; z 2 X be three distinct alternatives such that fxg = C (fx; yg), x 2 C (fx; zg), and y 2 C (fy; zg). We show that fxg = C (fx; y; zg). Assume, to the contrary, that fxg 6 = C (fx; y; zg).
As C is a reason-based choice rule and y x and z x, we have that x 2 M (fx; y; zg; ). If x z, then z = 2 M (fx; y; zg; P ), and so that fxg = M (fx; y; zg; ). It follows from our supposition that fxg = C (fx; y; zg), a contradiction. Otherwise, consider x; z 2 C (fx; zg). If fyg = C (fy; zg), then z = 2 M (fx; y; zg; ). Because fxg = M (fx; y; zg; ), it follows that fxg = C (fx; y; zg), a contradiction. Therefore, let y; z 2 C (fy; zg). So, we have that x; z 2 M (fx; y; zg; ). Because (z; fx; y; zg) (x; fx; y; zg), it follows from our supposition that fxg = C (fx; y; zg), a contradiction.
For the converse, assume that C satis…es 2, W , WWARNI, SBDC, WWARP, and RBB. Given X, de…ne the relation on X as follows: for x; y 2 X, with x 6 = y: x y , C (fx; yg) = fxg.
We have to prove that, for all S 2 S, C (S) = fx 2 M (S; ) j (x; S) (y; S) for no y 2 M (S; ) nfxggg holds true and that is acyclic.
To show acyclicity of , suppose x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x t 2 X are such that x 1
x for 2 f2; :::; tg, that is, C fx 1 ; x g = fx 1 g for 2 f2; :::; tg. Let S = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x t g S. Suppose that x 2 C (S) for 2 f2; :::; tg. As 2 holds, we have x 2 C fx 1 ; x g , and so x 1 x , a contradiction.
Then x = 2 C (S) for 2 f2; :::; tg. It follows from the nonemptiness of
. Because x t 2 Snfx 1 g and 2 holds, we have x 1 2 C fx 1 ; x t g . This implies x t x 1 , as desired.
Take any S 2 S, and let x 2 C (S). We show that x 2 M (S; ) and (x; S) (y; S) for no y 2 M (S; ) nfxg. Assume, to the contrary, that x = 2 M (S; ) or there exists y 2 M (S; ) nfxg such that (x; S) (y; S).
As x 2 C (fx; yg) for all y 2 S, by 2, the case x = 2 M (S; ) is not possible.
Thus, let x 2 M (S; ) and (x; S) (y; S) for some y 2 M (S; ) nfxg.
Take any z 2 (y; S) n (x; S). Because fyg = C (fy; zg), y 2 C (fx; yg), and z 2 C (fx; zg), RBB implies fyg = C (fx; y; zg). It follows from SBDC that fyg = C ( (y; S) [ fx; yg). If Sn ( (y; S) [ fx; yg) is empty, then x = 2 C (S), a contradiction. Otherwise, let Snf (y; S) [ fx; ygg be a nonempty set. Because x and y are indistinguishable on Sn ( (y; S) [ fx; yg) and
Assume that x 2 M (S; ) and (x; S) (y; S) for no y 2 M (S; ) nfxg.
We show that x 2 C (S). Because x 2 M (S; ), it follows that x 2 C (fx; yg) for all y 2 S. If fxg = M (S; ), it is clear, by 2 and the nonemptiness of C, that fxg = C (S). Otherwise, consider fxg 6 = M (S; ). By the nonemptiness of C, fxg = C (S) whenever y = 2 C (S) for all y 2 Snfxg.
Thus, let y 2 C (S) for some y 2 Snfxg. It follows from the paragraph above that y 2 M (S; ) and (y; S) (z; S) for no z 2 M (S; ) nfyg.
Therefore, fx; yg = C (fx; yg). If (y; S) is empty, then (x; S) must be empty, and so W implies x 2 C (S). Thus, let (y; S) be a nonempty set. It follows that (x; S) is nonempty as well. If (x; S) = (y; S) for some y 2 C (S), W implies x 2 C (S). So, let (x; S) 6 = (y; S) for all y 2 C (S). Thus, for any y 2 C (S), there exists z 2 (x; S) n (y; S) and w 2 (y; S) n (x; S). Therefore, for all y 2 C (S), fx; y; zg S for some z 2 (x; S) n (y; S). Since fxg = C (fx; zg), z 2 C (fy; zg), and x 2 C (fx; yg) it follows from RBB that fxg = C (fx; y; zg). Because this holds for any y 2 C (S), WWARNI implies x 2 C (S).
The mutual independence of choice-consistency conditions used in Theorem 1 has been relegated to the Appendix A.
Observe that a reason-based choice correspondence does not meet Sen's Suppose that u; v; w; x; y and z are distinct feasible alternatives, and let choice in pairs be as displayed in Figure 2 , where a ! b stands for fag = C (fa; bg), whilst no arrow between a and b stands for fa; bg = C (fa; bg).
For an example violating only 2, …x X = fu; x; zg, and suppose C (X) = X. C is not a reason-based choice correspondence because z = 2 M (S; ) but z 2 C (S). 2 is violated as z = 2 C (fx; zg). All other choice-consistency conditions are satis…ed.
For an example violating only W , …x X = fu; x; zg, and suppose C (X) = fug. C is not a reason-based choice correspondence because x 2 M (S; ) and there does not exist a 2 M (S; ) nfxg such that (x; S) (a; S) but x = 2 C (X). W is violated because fu; xg = C (fu; xg), u and x are indistinguishable on fzg, and u 2 C (X) but x = 2 C (X). All other choice-consistency conditions are satis…ed.
For an example violating only WWARNI, …x X = fv; w; x; zg. Let C (S) be a reason-based choice correspondence for all S 2 SnX, and suppose C (X) = fvg. C is not a reason-based choice correspondence because x 2 M (X; ) and there does not exist a 2 M (X; ) nfxg such that (x; X) (a; X), but x = 2 C (X). WWARNI is violated because v 2 C (X), and there exists S = fv; x; zg X such that fxg = C (S) and fx; vg S, x 2 C (fa; xg) for all a 2 X, but x = 2 C (X). All other choice-consistency conditions are satis…ed.
For an example violating only SBDC, …x X = fu; v; y; zg. Let C (S) be a reason-based choice correspondence for all S 2 SnX, and suppose C (X) = fu; yg. C is not a reason-based choice correspondence because u; y 2 M (S; ) and (y; S) (u; S), but y 2 C (X). SBDC is violated because C (fu; v; yg) = fug and fug = C (fu; zg) but C (X) 6 = fug. All other choice-consistency conditions are satis…ed.
For an example violating only WWARP, …x X = fw; x; y; zg. Let C (S) be a reason-based choice correspondence for all S 2 SnX, and suppose C (X) = Xnfzg. C is not a reason-based choice correspondence because w; x; y 2 M (S; ), (w; S) ; (y; S) (x; S), but w; y 2 C (X).
WWARP is violated because C (fx; y; zg) = fxg, y = 2 C (fx; y; zg), x and y are indistinguishable on fwg, but y 2 C (X). All other choice-consistency conditions are satis…ed.
For an example violating only RBB, …x X = fx; y; zg. Let C (X) = fx; yg. C is not a reason-based choice correspondence because x; y 2 M (S; ),
